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Abstract—This article presents the WOLF (Wallet Open 
Library Framework) platform which supports an original 
interface for NFC developers called “SE-QL”. SE-QL is a SQL-
like interface which eases and optimizes NFC secure application 
development in making the heterogeneity of the Secure Element 
(SE) transparent. SE implementation could be “embedded” (eSE) 
in the mobile device, or inside the SIM Card (UICC), or “on-
host” software-based, or in the Cloud (e.g. through HCE); every 
SE implementation has its own interface(s) making NFC secure-
application development extremely cumbersome and complex. 
Proposed SE-QL solves this problem. This article demonstrates 
the feasibility and attractiveness of our approach based upon an 
original high-level API. 
Keywords—Mobiquitous services; Near Field Communication 
(NFC); Secure Element (SE); Smart card; Structured (English as 
a) Query Language (SQL); Digital Wallet; TSM / OTA; UICC 
I. INTRODUCTION: WOLF AND SE-QL 
Based upon both our Near Field Communication (NFC) 
know-how and our SQL (Structured Query Language for 
databases) expertise [1], we propose a generic innovative 
Framework called WOLF (Wallet Open Library Framework) 
for facilitating Service Providers (SPs) in the process of 
development and deployment of new NFC secure applications 
on a wide range of smartphones having different SE 
implementations. 
In this article we give an overview of WOLF platform 
developed at MBDS innovation laboratory, which allows NFC 
developers to interact easily with an application based on NFC 
Card Emulation mode by using SQL-like language, “SE-QL”. 
WOLF framework allows SPs to reduce NFC development 
costs and the time-to-market, improve and ensure the quality of 
products applications for new secure NFC services. 
WOLF extends “NFC Container” project [2], [3] previously 
developed at MBDS in 2008-2010 for J2ME cell phones. Its 
SE-QL interface idea stems from a long-term research 
background on SQL and database (DB) systems; SE-QL 
simplifies NFC service development by abstracting the core 
software complexity associated with the management of 
multiple SE environments. 
WOLF supports the secure ecosystem of F1RST project in 
India with Tata Consulting Services (TCS), Gemalto and the 
Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc) of Bangalore under research 
contract from IFCEPAR | CEFIPRA (www.cefipra.org). 
F1RST encompasses a portfolio of NFC financial and rural 
inclusion use cases for unbanked people in India (70% of them 
owning a cell phone) managed within a F1RST wallet 
developed by TCS on top of WOLF platform. F1RST primary 
goals were to demonstrate Financial Inclusion (FI) services for 
unbanked people based upon: 
 Virtual “mobiquitous money” [4], 
 The appeal of NFC standard both to strategic use cases 
(Financial Inclusion, Narega, Mobiquitous NFC Public 
Distribution System “M-PDS” [5], [6], [7]), and 
disruptive ones (e-coins, rural animal bank with 
crowdfunding “BARTER2.0” [8]). 
WOLF has been successfully tested in the development of 
M-PDS use case prototyped at MBDS since 2012 and it is 
integrated into F1RST generic platform. 
We have been working on the Android SE-QL interface 
with the delivery of WOLF API which is compliant with 
SIMAlliance Open Mobile API (OMAPI) with Gemalto SE-
UICC, as well as Android Host-based Card Emulation (HCE) 
using WOLF generic applet; this work was presented at the 
WIMA’s research track conference in Monaco (April, 2014) 
[9], at the Indo-French Conference in New Delhi (October, 
2013), and at the Indo-French Center for the Promotion of 
Advanced Research (IFCPAR | CEFIPRA) meeting in St Malo 
(May, 2014). 
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The remaining of this document is organized as follows: in 
section II, we do a synthetic state of the art around the NFC 
standard and NFC secure application development; we also 
discuss the NFC Container project, its context, scopes and 
benefits for WOLF contribution. In section III, we study the 
proposed SE-QL interface and the WOLF API based upon 
related works and existing technologies. WOLF and SE-QL 
implementation are also described in this section with some 
uses cases concerning the F1RST project. In conclusion, we 
summarize the benefits of this research platform and present 
some promising extensions 
II. NFC ECOSYSTEM AND SECURE NFC APPLICATION 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE SE 
NFC is a very fast establishment and very short-range (for 
security purposes) contactless communication technology and 
world standard since 2004. NFC uses the inductive coupling 
making a source device (acting as initiator) able to provide 
energy and exchange data with a target passive device (without 
need battery) by backward induction. NFC will be a standard in 
next generation smartphones. 
Our future will be “mobiquitous” [2], [3], [10] around the 
convergence of mobility of cell phones becoming computers 
(smartphones) and ubiquity of Internet (becoming social and 
broadband) ); NFC is an underlying technology and standard 
supporting mobiquity. NFC connectivity induces five 
additional dimensions to enrich information services (the five 
“W”). “Who”: the identity of the end-user (with habits, 
preferences and POIs), “Where & When” space and time 
(“here and now”, when tapping), “Whereabout” the goal, 
expected result (information? transaction?) and the “What”, the 
final outcome (information, ticket transaction, appointments, 
service, triggering mechanisms, etc.) [2]. Unlike contactless 
smart cards services, NFC mobile services benefit from 
features of the smartphones: network high connectivity, 
embedded sensors, location-based ecosystem, camera, high-
definition and touchscreen user interface bring NFC services at 
a higher level of expectation and innovation, extending SP 
information system to the end-user allowing screens, real time 
interactivity, personalization, traceability and live updates 
without storage limitation (and Cloud synchronization). 
In terms of tracking the smartphone coupled with NFC at 
least enables to get 3-dimensional transaction identification: 
space, time and biometrics (as demonstrated in [3]). 
NFC standard can be classified into two categories 
regarding NFC applications: (i) those that do not require 
security using NFC read / write mode (m-tourism, marketing 
2.0… Similar to QR codes) or NFC P2P mode (e.g. initiate 
Bluetooth® pairing), and (ii) those that need to store 
confidential data and do transactions in the secure environment 
provided by the Secure Element (SE) using the NFC card 
emulation mode (digital identity, ticketing, couponing, 
electronic money / m-payment, access control, transactions 
etc.) where the NFC device acts as a smart card. 
In our research we focus on the latter case, i.e. on NFC card 
emulation mode which requires the NFC service and sensitive 
data to be hosted in the SE. 
A. NFC standard 
The NFC standard is a very revealing technology of the 
expected convergence between the worlds of 
telecommunications, consumer electronics and computing. It is 
one of the numerous RFID standards (known technology since 
the 1940s) operating over the unlicensed 13.56 MHz frequency 
of up to ten centimeters (one to four in practice). It is a wireless 
technology which could be integrated into mobile phones 
allowing them to exchange information with other devices 
(mobile phone, printers, locks or any NFC card readers) and 
NFC tags (ISO / IEC 14443 - NXP MiFare - Type A or Type 
B, and Sony-FeliCa). 
Since initial standard specification in 2006 by the NFC 
Forum (www.nfc-forum.org, funded in 2004 by Nokia, Sony, 
and Philips semiconductors, now NXP) of NFC standard, many 
specifications have increased the attractiveness of this world 
standard especially since it is widely available on Android 
devices. 
NFC Forum specifications apply to the physical and data 
link layers of Open System Interconnection model (OSI) 
whereas GlobalPlatform (GP) widely contributes to the 
standardization of SE security architecture, internal and 
external mechanisms, etc., and Trusted Environment Execution 
(TEE). GP is the main reference for SE standardization; 
GSMA and ETSI also play an important role, as the SIM-
centric model is the only one to be standardized end-to-end. 
Most popular SEs, at the moment, are SIM-based. 
The NFC standard (ISO / IEC 14443) has three basic 
operating modes: 
 Read / Write: The NFC cell phone acts as an active 
reader and can read and / or write data to or from a 
passive NFC tag. 
 NFC Peer-to-Peer (P2P): Allows two NFC devices to 
be active and exchange information interactively. 
 Card Emulation: The phone behaves as well as a 
passive contactless card (EMV, American Express, 
access card, Ticketing...) for a NFC reader (POS). 
B. NFC card emulation mode with APDU messages 
The card emulation mode is the extension of contact-based 
smart cards to contactless NFC cards; it inherits the smart card 
programing standards, especially the small data packets called 
APDUs (Application Protocol Data Unit) used to communicate 
with the services hosted and running in the smart card / SE 
(also called “applet” or “cardlet”). This requires a high-profile 
developer with strong expertise in communication protocols to 
handle low-level data structures at the byte level and integrate 
strong environmental constraints related to the execution 
environment of the SE. 
APDU protocol was originally specified in the Java 
Specification Request (JSR) 177 (Security and Trust Services 
API for J2ME™) taken up by smart cards standard ISO / IEC 
7816-4 (Identification Cards - Integrated Circuit Cards with 
Contacts: Organization, security and commands for 
interchange) now extended to contactless smart cards. In 
This work within F1RST project is partly supported by IFCEPAR | 
CEFIPRA under grant No.7115 and Gemalto (supporting MBDS apprentices, 
and a CIFRE PhD research Scholarship). 
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addition, there are related standards (GP / OMAPI, EMV, EN 
726-3 for prepaid memory cards, etc.). 
Remark: APDU protocol does not manage the device 
connection or the channel opening. 
The APDU commands (C-APDU) is the message sent by 
the client application (initiator) to the service running in the 
SE. The structure is composed of a mandatory header of 4 
fields of one byte: (i) {CLA} (class field) defines the command 
type (standard, industry, using security or not), (ii) {INS} 
defines the command instruction, (iii) {P1} is the first 
parameter (0x00 if not defined), (iv) {P2} is the second 
parameter (0x00 if not defined), and a conditional body of 3 
optional parameters of a variable length: (i) {Lc} is the 
conditional data length of 1 or 3 (extended APDU*) bytes if 
not empty,(ii) {Data} is the payload data of {Lc} length if not 
empty, (iii) {Le} is the expected length of the response data 
varying from 1 to 3 (extended APDU*) bytes if not empty. 
The APDU response (R-APDU) is made of the optional 
response data (that cannot exceed the length defined in {Le} 
field provided in the C-APDU), and the 2 bytes response status 
words {SW1} and {SW2} giving the status of the C-APDU. 
When the command is successful, the service returns the status 
words 0x9000. 
 
Fig. 1. APDU messages structure 
TABLE I.  EXAMPLE OF APDU ERROR STATUS WORDS 
SW1, SW2 Meaning 
0x6A82 File not found 
0x6700 Incorrect data length 
0x6981 Incorrect file type 
0x6982 Security status not satisfied 
0x6984 Invalid data 
0x6985 Conditions not satisfied 
0x6A86 Incorrect P1 and/or P2 parameter(s) 
0x6D00 Unsupported command instruction 
 
TABLE II.  EXAMPLE OF CLA CODES 
CLA byte Command type 
0x00  ISO standard command 
0x04 ISO standard command with security 
0xB0 to 0xCF ISO standard INS instruction 
0x80 GP standard command 
0x84 GP standard command with security 
0xFF Commands for the reader 
 
TABLE III.  EXAMPLE OF INS CODES 
INS byte Instruction description 
0xA4 ISO / IEC 7816-9 SELECT FILE used to initiate 
communication with a service identified by its AID 
(provided in the payload data field) 
0x05 OMAPI SELECT SECURE STORAGE ENTRY 
0xB0 ISO / IEC 7816-4 READ BINARY 
0xD0 ISO / IEC 7816-4 WRITE BINARY 
0xD6 ISO / IEC 7816-4 UPDATE BINARY 
0xE0 ISO / IEC 7816-4 ERASE BINARY 
0x82 ISO / IEC 7816-4 MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION 
All standards combined, hundreds INS codes can be found 
(65536 possible combinations). 
Card Query Language (CQL) initially designed by Pierre 
Paradinas in the 1990s [11], [12], with GEMPLUS (now 
Gemalto), was the first approach of SQL-like APDU 
instructions. Smart Card Query Language (SCQL) has been 
standardized in 1999 by ISO / IEC 7816-7 “Interindustry 
commands for Structured Card Query Language (SCQL)” [13]. 
But SCQL is limited to specific smart cards with embedded lite 
Relational DataBase Management System (RDBMS) whereas 
SE-QL is not…. 
TABLE IV.  EXAMPLE OF SCQL INS CODES 
INS byte SCQL instructions in the payload 
0x10  CREATE, DROP, INSERT, DELETE, DECLARE, 
FETCH 
0x12 CREATE KEY, AUTHENTICATE, CHECK, BEGING 
TRANSACTION, COMMIT and ROLLBACK 
0x14 CREATE USER, CHANGE PASSWORD, UNLOCK, 
DELETE USER, etc. 
C. NFC mobile services basics (card emulation mode) 
There are two situations involving the communication with 
the NFC mobile service: (i) the client is an NFC terminal (e.g. 
POS), or an NFC handset (acting as a terminal); 
communication is done via NFC when the handset is 
approached to the terminal and the terminal has successfully 
initiated the communication, (ii) the client is a mobile 
application (typically a user interface); communication is done 
via a bridge depending on the target SE and platform, through 
the Radio Interface Layer (RIL), or sometimes through NFC 
Controller using Single Wire Protocol (SWP)… 
 
Fig. 2. NFC mobile application architecture (card emulation mode) 
In the architecture shown on Fig. 2, the NFC service 
running inside the SE processes the received C-APDU and 
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returns R-APDU. However, mobile handset may also act as a 
reader and be client for an external NFC service: in that case, 
the mobile application will send C-APDUs to the external NFC 
device and will receive the R-APDUs. 
Remark: A SE can host multiple services and the mobile 
application (user interface) can be client of a portfolio of NFC 
services; such an application is called a mobile wallet (m-
wallet). A service hosted in the SE is identified by its AID 
(specified by ISO / IEC 7816-5 “Numbering system and 
registration procedure for application identifiers”); the AID is 
used to route the messages. 
D. The Secure Element (SE) 
SE is mostly an electronic chip with its own processor 
capable of running applications such as JavaCard (applets) and 
guaranteeing a certain level of security and functionality. 
Hardware-based SEs have the same characteristics as the smart 
cards: a minimalist computing environment on a single chip, 
complete with CPU, ROM, EEPROM, RAM and I/O ports, 
preprogrammed with a multi-execution environment OS and 
security domains separated by firewall that guarantees mutual 
isolation between running applications. Recent smart cards 
include coprocessors implementing cryptographic algorithms 
(such as DES, AES and RSA) and conform to TEE 
specifications. 
SEs for mobile phones have all the capabilities of a smart 
card or even higher; they can theoretically be used for all types 
of applications using a smart card (prepaid cards, transportation 
cards, credit / debit cards, health, loyalty, couponing, storage of 
VPN access parameters, etc.). 
1) Hardware-based SE: SIM-SE, eSE or Removable SE 
a) The SIM-based SE handled by the Mobile Network 
Operator (MNO); Gemalto is providing such SE in our F1RST 
Consortium. The SIM card with its NFC interface is a 
Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). 
b) Embedded SE (eSE) outside the SIM into the terminal 
and handled by the device retailer (like Google, Nokia, 
Samsung). 
c) Removable SE in an external SD card or a sticker 
under control of a SP (e.g. banks, retail companies) with or 
without the NFC chip. 
The SE could encompass various applets with their own 
business models and access keys controlled by their owners. 
Theoretically the 3 hardware-based types of SE could work 
together depending on the Host Controller Interface (HCI) 
routing capabilities 
2) Software-based (card emulation) and SE in the Cloud 
The software emulation (of a smart card) is an approach to 
card emulation for NFC phones for services that do not need to 
be always available (i.e. when the mobile is off). It was 
introduced to mobile phones by Research In Motion (RIM) on 
the Blackberry platform. In addition to supporting different 
types of SE, the Blackberry 7 introduced the card emulation 
mode of NFC tags with a software application on the mobile 
phone. Host-based Card Emulation (HCE) is the software card 
emulation solution available on Android devices since the end 
of 2013 with Android KitKat. HCE services run in the host 
processor as well as other services making this solution less 
secure and most vulnerable to malwares [14]. 
On the other hand, NFC software-based implementation is 
much lighter to develop and truly simplifies the deployment; 
SP can deploy its NFC services itself. Furthermore, even if 
software card emulation approach cannot be a solution “as is”, 
security could be strengthened by encryption mechanisms; 
such a “crypted soft-SE” is currently studied by IISc Bangalore 
in F1RST Consortium. 
Another solution is to relocate the SE in the cloud (Cloud-
SE) [15]. In this case, NFC services running on the mobile 
device relay the instructions to the remote Cloud-SE server 
(e.g. via Web services) and get back the returned responses. 
This approach reduces the complexity of the chain of 
deployment of new NFC services. It also has the major 
advantage to be hardware-independent and offers better safety 
(neither credentials nor sensible data are stored on the 
smartphone) and higher (unlimited?) storage capacity than 
other SEs, but increases the transactions latency. This approach 
which assumes always-on air reachability was discarded from 
our F1RST project, but it will also be studied for WOLF API. 
 
Fig. 3. Several SE architectures 
E. Trusted service manager (TSM) and OTA interactions 
NFC ecosystem incorporates several actors: computer 
information systems developers, MNOs, SPs, handsets retailers 
and chip cards manufacturers, etc. This implies an 
interoperability of the bodies that govern many heterogeneous 
domains (telecom, banking, technology, security and 
cryptography, rights to privacy, government, and other 
consecutive intermediates). This drives SPs outside their 
business domain. The TSM standards have emerged as the 
“split TSM” (SP TSM and MNO TSM, see Fig. 4) proposed by 
GP in 2011 which is basically provided as Web services. 
NFC services hosted in the SE can be initially installed and 
built-in by MNOs or could dynamically be loaded on demand 
(by touching an NFC tag or by scanning a 2D tag or through 
Internet, etc.) onto the cell phone. This is done “Over-The-Air” 
(OTA), under the responsibility or not of the MNO managing 
the SE and the applets. Remote dynamic download and 
provisioning of applications, content, services, tickets, 
coupons… are then possible in a secure way. Every applet 
could be managed remotely by the TSM. 
When the SE is in the SIM, MNOs have the responsibility 
of creating security domains on the SIM card for the NFC SPs. 
TSMs have the responsibility of credentials and encryption 
keys management of the SP security domain, application 
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loading into SP security domain, mobile wallet management, 
and service lifecycle management services (activation, 
personalization, maintenance, deletion). TSMs implement 
OTA communication into the NFC-enabled mobile phone and 
into the SE. 
 
Fig. 4. NFC: a complex ecosystem [1] 
F. NFC mobile payment and mobiquitous money 
The payment industry seems to be naturally part of the 
NFC ecosystem by dematerializing payment cards in the SE to 
allow the phone to be used as a mean of payment. 
The payment operators add contactless payment 
capabilities to their payment card (e.g. American Express 
ExpressPay, MasterCard PayPass, and Visa PayWave), to 
create an open loop approach to virtual local emerging money. 
These services enable end-users to tap and pay their purchase 
approaching their contactless card or NFC phone to an NFC 
payment terminal (POS). 
In emerging countries, mobiquitous money could replace 
the cash playing a double attractive role for unbanked people: 
NO CASH OUT solutions (by accessing a digital wallet) and 
targeted help / donation through tagged products delivered to 
the beneficiary and biometric identification like in the 
prototype of M-PDS use case of F1RST project [5], [6], [7], 
[8], [9]. 
G. Related work: “NFC Container” project at MBDS with 
Gemalto 
The project inherits of the know-how of MBDS innovation 
lab at University of Nice - Sophia Antipolis: in 2011, the 
university deployed an innovative project based on “NFC 
container” architecture called “Nice Future Campus” where the 
student’s phone plays the role of a virtual card with a portfolio 
of services running in the SIM-SE provided by Orange (m-
payment for the university cafeteria, access to geotagged 
campus information, consulting jobs and internships for 
students, access to the library, etc.). 
NFC container is a SE content management API proposed 
by MBDS in 2008 as a result of a research contract with the 
French DGE (“Direction Générale des Entreprises”) of the 
Ministry of Industry. This project has been driven in order to 
reduce the development time and the “time-to-market” of new 
NFC services. It is partly described in [2], and [3]. 
This project aimed to provide a set of tools in order to: 
 Develop secure applications using NFC c. 
 Deploy these applications to a large panel of NFC 
enabled mobile phone customers. 
 Interact with those applications within the SE. 
NFC Container project led to a high level API for SPs in 
order to manage their NFC services more easily. 
The proposed API was a generic JavaCard application that 
allows a dynamic content management onto the SE. The 
implementation was compliant with NFC Forum standard 
specifications and runnable on every GP compliant SE. 
The project was based on a generic applet that can be 
preloaded into the SE or loaded “on demand” by the end-user 
(through TSM / OTA). 
 
Fig. 5. NFC container instance [2] 
The main idea was to access the “SE as a DB” where any 
privacy data from a client application can be managed. Each 
user (e.g. SP developer) is identified by a security key on the 
applet. NFC Container API provides developers some ways to 
implement additional layers for more complex data 
management. In that case, the SP develops its own application 
using the generic API which provides a set of functions (SQL-
like) for data management on the card. 
We illustrate the added value in terms of code 
simplification by the following Java coding example retrieved 
from [2]: 
Source code 1. Example of NFC Container code simplification 
//-----------------------------------------// 
// Example of Java coding without using    // 
// NFC Container                           // 
//-----------------------------------------// 
short index = GetIdxToDO(tag); 
if (index == (short) DO_NOT_FOUND) { 
  //DO not found-> create a new one// 
  short index2free = GetIdxToFreeSpace(); 
  short freesize= (short) (SIZE_MEMORY – 
                           index2free);  
  //calculate size of free space// 
  short DOsize = (short) (lc+LEN_TAG+LEN_LEN);  
 
 
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
Vol. 5, No. 8, 2014 
25 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
  //calculate size of the new DO// 
  if (DOsize <= freesize) { 
    //it is enough space for a new DO// 
    memory[index2free] = (byte) tag;  
   //set DO tag// 
   memory[(short) (index2free + LEN_TAG)] = 
                         (byte) lc;  
   //set DO length// 
   //copy the DO atomic into the memory// 
   Util.arrayCopy(cmd_apdu,   
     (short)((ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA) & 0x00FF), 
       memory, (short) (index2free + LEN_TAG + 
                     LEN_LEN), lc); 
//-----------------------------------------// 
// Versus coding with NFC Container        // 
//-----------------------------------------// 
void 
insertRecord(byte[]record,  
        shortrecordOffset,  
        shortrecordLength) 
NFC Container advantages: 
Since access to the hardware-based SE is supervised by the 
NFC ecosystem owners, the deployment of new NFC services 
is necessarily related to them. To be able to test a new service 
to be installed in the SE, the developer has firstly to get the 
keys of the security domain. He has to deal with (physical) SE 
providers (MNOs, Gemalto, Oberthur…) and get some SIM 
cards. This is not simple as those access keys must remain 
secret in order to keep SE’s security level. 
Through the NFC Container, the developer has access to 
the generic pre-installed and fully customizable applet on the 
SE. Thus, the API allows developing new NFC applications 
without necessarily needing any high level security access and 
requires a smaller level of knowledge for NFC developers and 
services providers, allowing them to focus on their client 
application not in the applet management. 
WOLF API is an extension of NFC Container project to the 
smartphone ecosystem with the formalization of SE-QL. 
III. SE-QL AND WOLF API: A GENERIC SQL-LIKE 
INTERFACE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE SE 
The primary SE function is to store (sensitive and 
confidential) data: the majority of the (contact or contactless) 
card applications consist in storing and retrieving data (with or 
without pre-processing, with or without security mechanisms). 
The second fact is the building APDUs remains a cumbersome 
task for the developers: manipulating hexadecimal codes is not 
simple to human understanding; it is time consuming to be 
implemented and it is difficult to maintain. 
In this section we illustrate the SE-QL foundation based on 
DataBase Management System (DBMS) concepts. We present 
our contribution to the project with the WOLF API at the 
development current stage, and we describe the 
implementation within use cases prototypes of the F1RST 
project. 
A. Relational databases and SQL background 
A database is a set of structured data associated with a 
schema derived from real world by applying a data model 
(relational, object). DBMS allow databases management 
through a standardized interface called SQL [1], [16], [17]. 
They provide TIPS (Transaction, Integrity, Persistence and 
Structuration / schema) services for development of 
information systems development [2]. 
A DBMS integrates 3 levels: 
 Data Description Language (DDL): Defines a language 
allowing description of objects (tables, domains, 
databases, views, procedures…). 
 Data Manipulation Language (DML): Defines a 
standard data manipulation language allowing 
interrogating and updating a DB without specifying any 
access algorithm (SQL3 being the current standard [1] 
for relational databases). 
 Data Control Language (DCL): Defines some integrity 
and confidentiality constraints in order to manage user’s 
rights and authorizations on objects. 
The DBMS ensures consistency of data in databases and 
defines some mechanisms such as sharing, security, physical 
and logical independence of data, access performances in share 
or exclusive mode. 
DBMS can handle several standard request mechanisms 
allowing manipulating data (read, write, delete, update, sort, 
etc.). The SQL language, created in 1974 and first normalized 
in 1986 is used to perform operations on relational databases. It 
allows developers to interact with a RDBMS without showing 
physical aspect of data and is compatible with DDL, DML and 
DCL. SQL’s instructions syntax is pretty close to the human 
language in order to make it easier to learn and to read by a 
human user. 
B. From SQL DBMS to SE’s Applet 
GP compliant SE is divided in a set of Security Domains 
(SDs) separated by firewalls allowing several services to be 
safely executed on the same card. 
Each SD is dedicated to a type of business model. On 
Fig. 6, the first SD is reserved for the card issuer (MNO, 
manufacturer...); it contains maintenance and additional 
customer’s (SP) services. Others are dedicated to the SPs 
services (transportation, payment card, loyalty card, coupons, 
etc.). 
A DBMS manages a set of databases contains tables 
consisted of rows and columns / fields. On the other hand, the 
SE is composed of SDs hosting running applets managing their 
own data / fields (see Fig. 7).  
 
Fig. 6. Security Domains inside the SE 
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Fig. 7. Similarities between a SE and a DBMS 
We can infer the following conclusions: 
 The execution environment provided by the SE could 
be seen as equivalent to a DBMS: the OS manages the 
SDs and the DBMS manages databases; 
 An NFC service hosted in the SE (applet) could be seen 
as a table of the DB; 
 The data fields of an applet could be seen as the 
columns of the table. 
C. DDL, DML, and DCL applied to the SE-QL 
Note: at this stage, the instructions are not yet all been 
implemented in SE-QL. 
1) Data Description Language (DDL) 
These instructions are intended for the SE management 
with special maintenance privileges: 
 CREATE – to create new services (applets) in the SE 
 ALTER – to modify the structure of the SE data storage 
 DROP – delete objects from the SE 
2) Data Manipulation Language (DML) 
These instructions are intended for the NFC service 
management with the SP privileges: 
 SELECT – read data from the applets of the SE 
 INSERT – write data fields into an applet of the SE 
 UPDATE – update existing data fields within an applet 
of the SE 
 DELETE – deletes the records from an applet of the SE 
3) Data Control Language (DCL) 
  GRANT – provide access privileges 
  REVOKE – remove access privileges 
D. Principle of SE-QL 
First objective is to hide this low-level implementation of 
byte arrays by providing the same generic and developer-
friendly interface regardless of the platform (initially 
developed on Java and Android devices, later on Windows 
Phone and other platforms like HTML5). 
1) SE-QL algorithm 
A SQL query is composed of two parts: a mandatory part 
containing the statement and the object affected by the 
command, and an optional part using algebraic operators for 
projection, selection, junction and division. 
For a given applet uniquely identified by its alias (matching 
its AID), SE-QL model makes a correspondence between an 
SQL-like instruction (CREATE, INSERT, SELECT, 
UPDATE, DELETE, etc.) and the assigned APDU instruction, 
whereas the data model gives the records SE-QL alias, their 
corresponding hexadecimal identification (ID) in the APDU 
instruction parameter, and the maximum length expected by 
the applet. 
For example, we can illustrate a simplified use case in 
which the developer would check and update the balance 
stored by a portfolio applet. This is done in two steps: (i) read 
“balance” record from “portfolio” applet, (ii) update “balance” 
record from “portfolio” applet. This will be translated as 
following in SE-QL language: (1) “SELECT balance FROM 
portfolio”, (2) “UPDATE portfolio SET balance = {value}”. 
To be done, the metadata must provide portfolio applet AID, 
SELECT and UPDATE translation into APDU protocol, and 
the “balance” record byte identifier: 
TABLE V.  EXAMPLE OF SE-QL INSTRUCTIONS 
Description SE-QL meaning/ alias APDU transcription 
Applet / 
relation {used 
for the 
communication 
initialization} 
portfolio  AID: F0000000001 
Class standard & Security 
compliance 
CLA: B0 {ISO / IEC 7816-
4} 
Instruction 
SELECT 
INS: B2 {READ 
RECORD} 
UPDATE 
INS: DC {UPDATE 
RECORD} 
Record 
projection 
Balance P1: 50 
Record value expected 
length 
Le: 0E {14} 
TABLE VI.  EXAMPLE OF SE-QL TO APDU COMMAND 
SE-QL command APDU command Return 
SELECT balance FROM 
portfolio 
 
B0B250000E 
Fields 
values 
UPDATE portfolio SET 
balance = 2000 
{payload data is given 
according the field length 
0x0E defined by the 
metadata} 
B0DC50000E00000000002000  
Number 
of rows 
updates  
In more complex use cases, several APDU commands may 
be handled within a single SE-QL instruction, for example, a 
statement regarding multiple fields. The activity diagram 
shown on Fig. 8 illustrates the processing of several fields 
algorithm, where APDU command sending corresponds to the   
greyed task. 
These examples illustrate the similarity between an APDU 
command and a SQL query; the rationale of our approach is to 
identify mechanisms between these two worlds. Moreover 
applets are not intended to manage large amounts of data like 
tables in relational databases; usually there are small pieces of 
data corresponding to tuples of information in a table in a 
DBMS. In addition, SE-QL language will be limited by the 
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already defined standards; SE-QL goal is only to ease NFC 
secure application development. 
 
Fig. 8. SE-QL SELECT instruction algorithm 
SE-QL is delivered as a Java package integrated in WOLF 
libraries that manages SE / reader connection and applet 
communication initialization. This is managed from SE-QL 
controller that is the entry point for the client applications of 
the SE. SE-QL controller is in charge to redirect instructions to 
the appropriate SE-QL interface according targeted platform, 
implementing the method “execute” that accepts the SE-QL 
instruction and the command ID. The result for a given 
command (identified by an ID) is forwarded through an event 
of the SE-QL callback currently in the form of a HashMap of 
returned data, concerned field name being the key. 
2) Metadata 
Metadata is actually provided as a XML (eXtensible 
Markup Language) file (which could be acquired on the fly 
during the installation of the application, for example from a 
web server); it contains one (or more) applet(s) configuration 
defining two models: the former describes the correspondence 
APDU / SE-QL commands, while the second describes the 
pattern of the data managed by the applet. The metadata are 
used by SE-QL parser on the side of the client application at 
the APDU commands building, as well as the generic applet 
for its data storage initialization (could also be provided as a 
script). 
Source code 2. Example of XML metadata file 
<seqlmetadata> 
   <applets> 
      <appletModel alias="pds_applet" AID="F0014144500002"> 
         <instructions> 
             <seqlModel> 
               <ins>SELECT</ins> 
               <cla>80</cla> 
               <value>B2</value> 
            </seqlModel> 
            <seqlModel> 
               <ins>INSERT</ins> 
               <cla>80</cla> 
               <value>D2</value> 
            </seqlModel> 
            </instructions> 
          <tables> 
            <tableModel> 
             <name>username</name> 
                <value>30</value> 
                <length>9</length> 
              </tableModel> 
              <tableModel> 
               <name>password</name> 
               <value>40</value> 
               <length>9</length> 
              </tableModel> 
              <tableModel> 
               <name>key</name> 
               <value>31</value> 
               <length>255</length> 
              </tableModel> 
              <tableModel> 
               <name>pin</name> 
               <value>50</value> 
               <length>4</length> 
              </tableModel> 
           </tables> 
      </appletModel> 
      <appletModel alias="wolf_hce" AID="F0014144500001"> 
         <instructions> 
  ... 
E. WOLF API 
As mentioned, WOLF aims to be an ontology-driven 
Framework based on self-descriptive metadata (being currently 
XML format). This is our prerequisite to ensure maintainability 
and portability of the components. The architecture of WOLF 
is drawn around the central concept of SE-QL being the 
interface for a simplified and optimized handling of the data 
that is the same regardless of the mobile and whatever SE type 
and whatever covered platform. This interface allows 
developers to define their own configuration in the metadata 
file (mapping the APDU instructions, description and alias of 
the data, etc.), making the interface compliant with already 
existing (contact or contactless) smart card standards or 
proprietary instructions. 
WOLF API encompasses a generic applet and a generic 
wallet each based on its own metadata that can be easily 
personalized for a rapid implementation (see Fig. 9). 
1) WOLF current progress 
Current API provides: 
 SE-QL package which is common for all Java-based 
platforms contains the SE-QL generic interface, APDUs 
handling classes, SE-QL callback interface, SE-QL 
parser, and metadata objects. 
 Android packages contains: (i) OMAPI SE-QL 
controller to access the SE with OMAPI API on 
Android SDK17 platform, (ii) HCE controller for 
Android SDK19 platform SE-QL, and (iii) the generic 
WOLF HCE service (that emulates the SE) able to 
communicate with (iv) WOLF generic applets. Android 
package will also contain the off-host APDU service** 
(to communicate with the SIM-SE), the generic Wallet 
UI, and Android reader for external devices (work in 
progress). 
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Fig. 9. WOLF architecture overview 
 Smart card reader package provides the SE-QL 
controller for Java™ Smart Card I/O API compliant 
with PC / SC (NFC) readers.  
 (4) HTTP package contains the HTTP requests helper 
for the sending of GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE 
requests (e.g. to access RESTful Web services), and the 
SOAP Web services helper. 
 Cryptography helper (encode / decode, generate hash 
key) is provided in the tools package. 
 TSM package contains tools dedicated to TSM (work in 
progress). 
WOLF for Android and SE-QL have been tested for three 
use cases so far : (i) SIM-based NFC service on Android 
device compiled with SDK17 (Android Jelly Bean, build 4.2.2 
or earlier on nonstandard build of CyanogenMod) using 
OMAPI, (ii) Android HCE generic service compiled with 
SDK19 (Android KitKat, build 4.4.2), and (iii) a Java 
application to test the communication between a USB NFC 
reader plugged to the PC (using standard PC / SC driver, see 
www.pcscworkgroup.com/) and an NFC device. 
The beta version of WOLF plugin for Android was 
implemented last year for CyanogenMod with seek-for-
Android [47] implementation of OMAPI (need the device 
bootloader to be unlocked and CyanogenMod build to be 
installed in replacement of standard OS on the phone). 
Afterward, OMAPI was formally integrated as an external API 
for Android standard build 4.2.2. But since Android KitKat, 
OMAPI is no more supported by the official Android build; it 
has been replaced by Android HCE, the software based card 
emulation mode. **On Android KitKat, SIM-SE access must be 
routed by Android off-host APDU service… 
 
Fig. 10. Major WOLF current components 
2) WOLF experimentation within F1RST project 
The F1RST wallet for Financial Inclusion (FI) uses SE-QL 
commands and WOLF platform in the end-to-end supply chain 
NFC services for the secure traceability of aids delivery. 
WOLF was successfully tested in the development of two use 
cases prototyped at MBDS in 2012-2014 within F1RST 
project; M-PDS (Mobiquitous NFC Public Distribution 
System) [8] and BARTER 2.0 (Bank of Animal in Rural 
TERritories 2.0 / Social Network of Donators) [8]: WOLF API 
and SE-QL are the kernel of mobile NFC services modules 
within use cases prototypes of F1RST wallet as shown in Fig. 
11. 
 
Fig. 11. Architecture of F1RST ecosystem [8] 
3) WOLF / SE-QL implementation 
On Android platform, WOLF library has to be referenced 
in the project properties. Once it is done, SE-QL controller 
class can be instantiated once with appropriate parameters 
(targeted platform, application context if Android, metadata 
file). Then, you can get the controller and use SE-QL to 
communicate with the SE, and receive events with the returned 
responses from the applet as shown in source code 3: 
 
 
 
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,  
Vol. 5, No. 8, 2014 
29 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
Source code 3. Android implementation of WOLF: SE-QL controller 
instantiation 
1. import org.mbds.wolf.seql.ISeqlCallBack; 
2. import org.mbds.wolf.seql.SeqlController; 
3. import org.mbds.wolf.seql.exceptions.ApduError; 
4.  
5. public class MyApplication extends Application  
6.                           implements ISeqlCallBack { 
7.       SeqlController ctrl = null; 
8.       //........ 
9.       protected void init() { 
10.       boolean ok = false; 
11.       try { 
12.          SeqlController.OS os =  
13.               SeqlController.OS.ANDROID_HCE; 
14.          if (android.os.Build.VERSION.SDK_INT<=19) 
15.              os = SeqlController.OS.ANDROID_OMAPI; 
16.          ctrl = new SeqlController( 
17.                 getApplicationContext(), os,  
18.              File metadata, this); 
19.          ok = true; 
20.       } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { 
21.          e.printStackTrace(); 
22.       } catch (NoSuchMethodException e) { 
23.          e.printStackTrace(); 
24.       } catch (InstantiationException e) { 
25.          e.printStackTrace(); 
26.       } catch (IllegalAccessException e) { 
27.          e.printStackTrace(); 
28.       } catch (InvocationTargetException e) { 
29.          e.printStackTrace(); 
30.       } 
31.       if (!ok) { 
32.          Toast.makeText(this, "SE-QL controller  
33.                 could not be instantiated,  
34;                 application will finish!",  
35.             Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
36.          quitApp(); 
37.       } 
38.    } 
39. } 
 
Source code 4. Android implementation of WOLF: executing SE-QL 
instruction 
1. public class MyActivity extends Activity  
2.                      implements ISeqlCallBack { 
3.  private SeqlController ctrl; 
4.    //… 
5.  @Override 
6.  protected void onCreate(Bundle 
7.                        savedInstanceState) { 
8.   super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
9.   MyApplication act =  
10.             (MyApplication)getApplication();  
11.       ctrl = act.getController(); 
12.  } 
13.  @Override 
14.  protected void onResume() { 
15.   super.onResume(); 
16.   ctrl.setCallback(this);      
17.   if(!ctrl.isServiceConnected()) { 
18.       ctrl.initService(); 
19.   } 
20.  } 
21.  private boolean executeSeqlCommand(String  
22.                      statement, int commandId) { 
23.   return ctrl.execute(statement, 
commandId); 
24.  } 
25.  @Override 
26.  public void onPINRequired() { 
27.   startActivityForResult(new 
Intent(this, 
28.                      PinEntryView.class),  
29.    Constant.PIN_REQUEST); 
30.  } 
31.  @Override 
32.  public void onResponse(Map<String, Object>  
33.                     results, int commandId) { 
34.   //Process results 
35.  } 
36.  //... 
37. } 
Fig. 12 gives an overview of components interaction 
showing how the client module (service UI) requires the name 
and the password of the handset end-user, stored by the applet 
using SE-QL; then, WOLF plugin initiates the connection and 
the applet requests the user PIN entry. When user PIN entry 
has been successfully transmitted, the previous SE-QL 
instruction can be processed. This sequence derived from 
F1RST use cases prototyped at MBDS was a first proof-of-
concept; the client module has been tested with the applet 
embedded in the SIM and the generic HCE applet of WOLF 
without requiring any code changes except for the manifest 
(and the Android host-apdu-service XML metadata), since 
HCE services must be declared in the client application. 
 
Fig. 12. Sequence diagram example using WOLF API 
The WOLF SE-QL reader Java tester is intended to test the 
communication with the applet hosted into the SE of the 
mobile phone: the tester frame is shown in Fig. 13: user grabs 
the SE-QL instruction in the input text area and clicks on the 
“Execute” button. Then, he is asked to place the device on the 
reader and the SE-QL instruction is parsed into APDU(s) 
command(s); the result is shown in the log trace view. 
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Fig. 13. SEQL tester for PC / SC Reader 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this report, we demonstrated SE-QL high added value 
making easy and fast the development of secure NFC mobile 
services using card emulation mode. The great advantage of 
SE-QL is that it is compatible with most APDU standards and 
can be used for already existing applets. SE-QL is a very good 
solution for applications that do not need complex transactions. 
Withal, it does not already fully meet ACID (Atomicity, 
Consistency, Isolation, and Durability) properties that 
guarantee the transactions are processed reliably; in the next 
release, we are focusing on the transactions integrity by 
implementing the mechanisms for the handling of a set of 
transactions that need to be completely executed in order to 
maintain system consistency. This will be done using the 
“BEGIN transaction”, “COMMIT”, and “ROLLBACK” 
instructions (taking care of the limitation of RAM will require 
a temporary serialization before complete execution) and the 
management of a time-out. But, as we talk about contactless 
communication, we may face untimely interruptions 
transactions when the devices are removed prematurely. 
Several researches have been done on database 
implementation in smart cards (that can apply to the SE) [11], 
[12], [13], [18]; this highlights the need for embedded DB 
system. Nowadays, lite databases have been adopted for low 
capacity systems like SQLite (www.sqlite.org) which is 
multiplatform compliant and it is provided as part of Android 
OS. This is why we will also explore other areas of 
investigation around embedded DB, and also other object-
oriented structures in the payload such as RESTful 
(Representational Sate Transfert) services, and the ability to 
provide XML, JSON (JavaScript Object Notation), etc. 
Another current important stuff is to manage security 
according standards specification. This will be done combining 
IISc Bangalore research on the crypted SE to ours, e.g. using 
cryptographic APIs (e.g. Cipher) and studying existing 
protocols, or by proposing new ones and Cloud-based solutions 
(studied at LSIS lab of Aix-Marseille University [11]). 
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